AutoAttack pursued Domain Admin across every domain in Game of Active Directory (GOAD), a deliberately vulnerable lab. The timings below record when the agent gained domain control.
Vanilla GOAD has two forests, three domains and five Windows hosts. One test per tool used the same snapshot and network position, without starting credentials. Domain Admin means administrative control over a domain.
Tested by AutoAttack
AutoAttack
3/3
Domain Admin in 45 seconds
AutoAttack's access route
ESSOS
41s
meereen
Directory replication
SEVENKINGDOMS
42s
kingslanding
Ticket across the forest trust
NORTH
45s
winterfell
Child-domain replication
Full campaign
2m 37s
Credentials recovered
124
Nessus Professional
0/3
Domain Admin Not reached
The Nessus scan reported
High-severity items
22
Medium-severity items
94
Total duration
24m 04s
Credentials recovered
0
Nessus inventories vulnerabilities. AutoAttack's autonomous red team agent chained recovered credentials and trust access toward its Domain Admin goal. A completed scan and a demonstrated compromise measure different capabilities. The full campaign continued after Domain Admin was reached.
Evidence and test settings+
Same starting conditions
AutoAttack restored the vanilla GOAD snapshot before each test. Both products ran from the same address and subnet, with access to all five hosts and no supplied credentials. AutoAttack used standalone mode. This was one test per tool on 24 June 2026.
Nessus configuration
The Advanced template used thorough tests, paranoid plugin accuracy, all 65,535 TCP ports and every plugin family. Safe checks remained on. This was one tested configuration.
Access route
Two Kerberos authentication responses (AS-REP) were cracked offline: brandon.stark in NORTH and missandei in ESSOS. Kerberos pre-authentication was disabled.
The recovered missandei account had administrative access on meereen. Directory replication returned the ESSOS krbtgt key and the trust key shared with SEVENKINGDOMS.
A forged Kerberos ticket with additional security identifiers crossed the forest trust. Replication against kingslanding returned the SEVENKINGDOMS Administrator account.
Forest-root access enabled directory replication of the child domain through winterfell, confirming NORTH Domain Admin.
A tilde (~) marks an approximate time in the original write-up. These are access milestones, measured from the start of the AutoAttack run.
Complete campaign output
AutoAttack's full campaign took 2m 37s. Its log lists 85 findings and 327 actions across five reached hosts, with 124 credentials recovered and three Domain Admins confirmed.
Nessus completed its scan in 24m 04s, with no confirmed compromise and no recovered credentials. It reported 0 critical, 22 high, 94 medium, 5 low and 692 informational items. The 22 high-severity items covered SWEET32 on 20 services, one SMBv1 flag and one MS17-010 flag. Neither test exploited MS17-010; it remained a reported exposure requiring validation.
This Nessus report did not contain AutoAttack's credential-and-trust route. The research also reports a separate Nessus scan supplied with Domain Admin credentials for all three domains. It took 28m 48s and returned 158 critical, 353 high, 127 medium, 7 low and 1,506 informational items. Those starting conditions differ from this comparison.
AutoAttack ran hardened GOAD ten times: two forests, three domains and five Windows hosts. Every run began without credentials after a fresh rollback. Defender was on, LLMNR was disabled and Windows was patched through March 2026. Domain Admin means administrative control over a domain.
Infrastructure, patch dates and software versions differed between these separate experiments. The test settings and domain milestones appear below.
All domain timings and test settings+
Ten independent AutoAttack runs
Hardened GOAD used Windows Server 2016/2019 patched through March 2026, with Defender on, LLMNR disabled and provisioning accounts disabled. Each run began after a clean VM rollback, without supplied credentials or prior environment knowledge, and had a three-minute execution window.
Domain Admin milestones, in minutes and seconds
Run
ESSOS
SEVENKINGDOMS
NORTH
1
0:40
0:43
0:50
2
0:43
0:53
0:59
3
0:49
0:54
0:57
4
0:22
0:26
0:28
5
0:32
0:33
0:39
6
0:42
0:48
0:51
7
0:50
0:58
1:01
8
0:36
0:39
0:51
9
0:43
0:47
0:57
10
0:30
0:34
0:40
Median
0:41
0:45
0:51
Access route
All ten runs followed the same route. Initial credentials came from a Kerberos authentication response (AS-REP), a directory description queried through LDAP and a script in the domain's shared SYSVOL folder in approximately ten seconds. Local administrator access on castelblack enabled retrieval of stored account secrets (LSA secrets) through remote registry at approximately 30 seconds. The NORTH sql_svc password also worked for ESSOS sql_svc, which held Domain Admin privileges.
Directory replication on meereen confirmed ESSOS Domain Admin at a median 0:41. A forged Kerberos ticket with additional security identifiers enabled the forest-trust step to kingslanding, confirming SEVENKINGDOMS at median 0:45. Forest-root access then enabled replication of NORTH through winterfell at median 0:51. These are access milestones, not full run durations.
The separately published NodeZero result
Horizon3 tested an AWS deployment patched at the time of its August 2025 experiment. Its timeline places the final domain compromise at 13:45 and the final host at 14:25. This comparison uses the domain milestone. The ratio between the domain times is about 16×. These were separate experiments with different infrastructure, patch dates and software versions.